Palabras clave
Limitaciones informales
Path dependence
Formal limitations
Informal limitations
Path dependence
Cómo citar
Resumen
Analizar cómo las instituciones colombianas están relacionadas (formales e informales) con el crecimiento económico de 1996 al 2016. La metodología utilizada fue cuantitativa descriptiva, se emplearon datos de bases secundarias (BM, Latinobarómetro y WGI). Los resultados demuestran un crecimiento paralelo entre la estabilidad política; las reglas/leyes; y el PIB per-cápita. En cambio, el control de la corrupción y la confianza generalizada presentaron un crecimiento inverso. Las instituciones formales e informales son determinantes para el crecimiento económico en Colombia. La implementación de instituciones más inclusivas puede aumentar los niveles de ingresos del país.
Citas
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